Pegasus confirmed on Serbian rector's iPhone; prosecutorial associate's case still under investigation

A confirmed infection and a separate targeting warning

Citizen Lab's October 19 research note reports high-confidence forensic evidence that the iPhone of Vladan Đokić, rector of the University of Belgrade, was infected with Pegasus during 2026. The researchers identify a zero-click exploit, meaning no user interaction was required. October 19 is the disclosure date, not an established attack date; the public findings do not narrow the infection timing beyond the year. [1]

The finding for Rade Bajić, a senior prosecutorial associate involved in the Generalštab corruption investigation, is different. He received an Apple threat notification on August 13 and a reminder on August 27. Citizen Lab considers this strong evidence of mercenary-spyware targeting, but its forensic analysis remains ongoing. Neither a successful infection nor Pegasus specifically has been established in his case. [1][2]

The new report does not publish a CVE, an affected iOS-version range, a detailed exploit chain or a case-specific fix. It also does not identify the operator. Those omissions limit what defenders can infer about exposure and remediation from this disclosure alone. [1]

What independent reporting corroborates

Reuters interviewed Bajić, who confirmed receiving the August warning while acknowledging that successful compromise had not been established. Apple separately confirmed to Reuters that it sent a batch of threat notifications on August 13, without confirming either man's individual case. These interviews independently support the notification timeline. They do not independently establish the spyware family, attacker or outcome in Bajić's case. [2]

The forensic conclusion about Đokić rests on Citizen Lab's primary research, not a second laboratory's replication. Reuters adds independent reporting rather than another device examination. SHARE Foundation participated in the wider investigation, while local outlet 021.rs carries SHARE's institutional assessment. Those accounts provide useful context, but should not be counted as separate forensic confirmations. Citizen Lab's public note is also not a complete package for reproducing its analysis. [1][2][3][4]

Why university and prosecutorial work are at stake

Bajić told Reuters that his work concerned allegations that officials improperly removed heritage protections from a former military complex planned for redevelopment by Jared Kushner's investment company. He believes that investigation motivated the targeting. That is his assessment, not a demonstrated causal finding. Reuters reported that Serbia's Interior Ministry and NSO did not respond to its inquiries; their lack of response does not establish responsibility. [2]

In a statement carried by 021.rs, SHARE argues that surveillance reaching university and prosecutorial figures threatens academic autonomy and independent public-interest work. The disclosure comes six days before Serbia's scheduled October 25 parliamentary election. Our assessment is that these institutional roles and the timing increase the urgency of protective action and investigation. Neither the timing nor the targets' roles establish election interference. [3]

The potential exposure goes beyond stolen account credentials. Citizen Lab describes Pegasus capabilities that include access to private device data, including encrypted messages on the phone, and covert microphone or camera activation. These capabilities explain the confidentiality concern, but they are not evidence that particular files, conversations or recordings were collected from Đokić. [1][5]

The reported total mixes targeting and infection

Citizen Lab says the new cases bring the publicly known total to at least 16 Serbian civil-society figures targeted or infected with mercenary spyware. That is not a count of 16 confirmed Pegasus infections. The earlier cohort already mixed different evidence types and spyware families, so the aggregate should remain explicitly attributed to the researchers rather than presented as a reconciled infection tally. [1][4][5]

There is also a counting discrepancy in the September disclosures. SHARE's September 2 breakdown described 12 Apple-alert recipients and two additional NoviSpy infections. Citizen Lab's contemporaneous note described at least 14 Apple-notification cases. The supplied findings do not reconcile those descriptions. They support a broader pattern of reported targeting, but not a precise breakdown that can safely be reconstructed from the headline totals. [4][5]

A separate student case provides technical context, not a remedy for Đokić's infection. Citizen Lab confirmed that student's Pegasus infection across December 2025 and January 2026, attributed delivery to an iMessage zero-click exploit and said it believed the exploit had been patched by iOS 18.4.1. The October report does not establish that the same exploit was used, so that earlier patch finding cannot be transferred to the new cases. [1][5]

Verify warnings and preserve evidence

An authentic Apple threat notification warrants urgent attention, but does not identify a particular spyware family or operator. Apple's guidance describes these as high-confidence targeting alerts. Recipients should verify the warning through the Apple Account interface reached independently. Genuine notifications do not ask for passwords or verification codes, or require recipients to install applications or open files. [6]

Specialist assistance and evidence preservation matter because device evidence can be overwritten. Access Now warns that an unsuccessful forensic search does not establish that a device is safe. A consumer scanner's clean result should therefore not close an investigation prompted by an authentic warning. Preserving evidence and seeking qualified help are more defensible than treating the absence of a finding as proof of no compromise. [7]

For high-risk Apple users, updating devices and enabling Lockdown Mode are practical protective measures. Apple explains that Lockdown Mode reduces attack surface by restricting functionality. This is protective hardening, not certification that an existing infection has been removed, and it should not be described as a verified fix for the newly disclosed exploit. [1][6][12]

What would materially change the picture

The clearest next milestone is the outcome of Bajić's forensic examination: whether researchers can establish compromise and identify the spyware involved. For Đokić, more precise infection timing, technical details, an identified operator or evidence of data collection would materially sharpen the assessment. None is established in the current public note. [1][2]

A reconciled account of the earlier cases would also improve confidence in the reported scale. Until then, coverage should preserve three distinctions: targeting is not confirmed infection, spyware capability is not demonstrated data theft, and political context is not attribution. Those boundaries leave a substantial public-interest story without claiming more than the evidence supports. [1][2][4][5]